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Abstract
Under the new Capital Accord banks can choose between differ-
ent type of risk management systems. Using a stylized model of risk
management systems which differ in quality and by modelling the
relationship between the bank board and the risk manager, we con-
sider the incentives for the adoption of a particular system. We show
that in some cases banks may adversely adopt an unsophisticated risk
management system in order to evade regulation.
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1 Introduction
Regulators already require that banks measure market risk with statistical
models, specifically Value–at–Risk (VaR) (see the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, 1996). Under the latest Basel–II proposals, the same general
methodology can be applied to measuring credit, operational, and liquidity
risk. In other words, statistical risk modelling (termed Internal Rating Based
or IRB) will become the linchpin upon which the stability of the financial
system rests.1 While the IRB approach has been well studied, one aspect
has received little attention: the participants’ preference for heterogeneity in
the risk modelling process, in particular incentives the key parties have for
accurately measuring risk, and the contractual relationship that binds the
risk manager, the bank owner, and the supervisor. Moreover, banks may opt
out of the IRB approach and use the BIS standardized approach. Our aim
is to explicitly address how a financial institution choices the quality of its
risk management system.
The environment is a classical principal–agent relationship between a bank’s
board of directors (principal) and a risk manager (agent). The setting is
complicated by the presence of external supervision which affects both the
agent and the principal. It is costly for the principal to measure risk, and
costly for the agent to reduce risk. This gives rise to an optimal intensity of
risk measurement and management. By introducing supervision, and hence
disclosure, into a previous unregulated setting, we find that supervision di-
rectly affects the level of risk management. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that the new accord has real effects, it is procyclical, and with appropriate
regulatory design, volatility can be reduced. In setting up the model we ad-
dress several issues. First, problems in specifying the regulators’ preferences.
Second, the reasoning for the choice of IRB and the quality level of risk
management. Third, the information asymmetry between the bank and the
supervisor with special reference to the fact that most banks are considerably
over capitalized. Finally,the impact of regulation on bank behavior .
The supervisors receive a mandate from the government to regulate the fi-
nancial industry, however in general their objectives are hard to ascertain.
Regulators have been reluctant to disclose the underlying reasoning for choos-
ing a particular regulatory regime, beyond the most general statements. For
example, the General Manager of the BIS has recently conjectured (Crock-
1The IRB methodology has received widespread criticism witness the comments cur-
rently at www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm. These criticisms range from individual
banks commenting on a particular aspect of the 2001 Basel–II proposals, to academics
criticizing the whole approach.
2
ett, 2000) that the key aim of financial regulation is to reduce economic costs
due to financial instability. In general, the consensus seems to be that is
the ultimate objective of financial regulation is to reduce systemic risk. This
however is not very useful when modelling regulatory preferences, since no
single definition of systemic crisis is available, (see the survey by De Bandt
and Hartmann, 2000). Moreover, a translation from systemic risk tolerance
to the risk tolerance by the regulator imposed on individual banks as a conse-
quence of its systemic risk tolerance is simply not available. Therefore, in the
current paper we take a positive approach and simply investigate different
risk levels permitted by the regulator and the consequences for the bank.2
The strategic choice of the quality of the risk management system is the
focus of this paper. It is clear that the use of internal models is preferred
by both the most important supervisors and the largest banks. It is equally
clear that smaller institutions and smaller countries are more skeptical of the
IRB approach. The supervisory reason for preferring internal models seems
to be that this may reduce regulatory arbitrage, and that the fact that banks
use internal models, may give regulators better insights into the internal
operations of a bank. Furthermore, Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) Governor
Meyer (2000) states that internal models may in the future have a dual use
for both supervisory and internal use within a financial institution where
the internal model becomes a prominent part of the supervisory process.3
This is in contrast to the current regime where the regulators mostly limit
themselves to observing the outcomes of internal model, and auditing the
modelling process. The largest banks prefer capital determined by IRB for
two major reasons: First, their capital charge will probably decrease under
Basel–II and IRB. Second, it gives them a strong competitive advantage over
less sophisticated institutions. Even though the largest banks prefer that
capital be model determined, it also carries with it potential costs. Having
regulatory supervision supervision of its risk management process may be
viewed by a bank as a competitive disadvantage. Not only may it be forced
to measure risk differently than it otherwise would, but the implied changes
to its operations may not be preferable. As a result, banks have incentives
2Whether the regulatory measures are optimal from the societies point of view of con-
taining systemic risk is outside the scope of the present paper.
3 FRB Governor Laurence H. Meyer (2000) states:
“We should all be aware that additional public disclosure is not a free good,
especially if it works. Banks will find that additional market discipline con-
strains their options, and supervisors will be concerned about creditors’ re-
sponse to bad news.”
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to game the regulatory risk management process even if it may not affect
its overall capital, and may adversely adopt a low quality system due to
the very fact that they are being supervised.4 Thus the interesting question
pertains to the underlying reason why internal models were promoted in the
first place, and in the end one may see that several institutions opt for the
standardized approach when reporting to supervisors.
We specifically consider a setting where the regulators directly observe and
influence the internal risk management process in a bank, and find that
this has the potential for lowering the quality of the risk management. In
our Proposition 2 we argue that in the absence of regulation it is in the
bank’s best interests to install a high quality internal risk management sys-
tem. However, subsequent to be regulated, we find in Proposition 3 that the
bank might actually prefer less internal risk control activity. In other words,
regulation has the potential to decrease risk control. Since, given the current
regulatory regime, banks internal models are used to calculate regulatory
risk capital, regulation may increase instability. Perhaps this result explains
the anecdotal evidence that some banks employ dual risk management sys-
tems, an elaborate system for internal control, and a scaled–down version for
reporting purposes.
2 The Principal–Agent Relationships
A financial institution consists of multiple interested parties each with their
own preferences and agenda. For example, traders are much more risk seeking
than the owners of a bank, and left uncontrolled would lead to unacceptable
levels of risk taking. A bank’s board of directors, or board in short, therefore
specifies acceptable risk levels for each unit within the organization. The
monitoring of these risk levels are left to a separate entity, the risk manager,
whose function it is to measure risk and enforce risk limits set by the board.
As such risk management is a cost center, and the board needs to split
resources between risk management and profit centers. In general, the more
resources are allocated to risk management the better risk is measured and
managed, but at the expense of lower profitability.
Since our interest is in understanding the interplay between internal and ex-
ternal risk management, we model the bank as a principal–agent relationship
between two separate entities, the board and the risk manager. The board in-
curs expenses by employing a risk manager and makes two related decisions:
4European Central Bank (2001, p. 69) says with so many words: “Banks with a
higher–risk portfolio, by contrast, might stick to the standardsed approach”.
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What resources to allocate to the risk management function and the degree
of delegation to the risk manager. The risk manager in turn decides based
on his compensation contract how much effort to put into actually managing
risk. The actual effort chosen depends on both the actual resources allocated
as well as the level of monitoring by the board, i.e., how much of the risk man-
agement function is delegated to the risk manager. In addition, the board
is itself subjected to supervision. We chose to not cast the supervisor-board
relationship in a principal agent setting for two reasons. First to maintain
tractability and obtain closed form solutions. Second, the objective function
of the regulators is not clearly defined. While this would be an interesting
topic for future research, we follow the observed regulatory drive for contain-
ing risk exposures in banks, by exogenously varying the allowable degree of
risk taking.
2.1 The Basic Model
Our basic setting is a standard principal–agent model with the following time
line. First, the board of directors, or board, b, of a bank (principal), maxi-
mizes its expected utility, EUb, by making an one time employment offer to a
risk manager, m, (agent). The manager by rejecting the offer earns nothing.
Consequently, her expected utility, EUm, derived from working must always
be non-negative. Alternatively, by accepting the offer, the manager selects an
effort, incurs personal disutility, and manages bank risk. Finally, the board
observes the outcome, and pays the manager the agreed–upon compensation.
There is no room for renegotiation. The board has all the bargaining power
and, in equilibrium, the manager accepts the offer and receives the certainty
equivalent of zero from the optimal contract.
Most principal–agent settings assume that the agent’s effort causes a first or-
der stochastic dominating shift in the distribution of the performance mea-
sure, see, among others, Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987). Recent models allow the agent to take an action that causes in-
stead a second order stochastic dominating shift, see e.g. Hughes (1982),
Sung (1995), or Demski and Dye (1999). We choose the latter modelling
approach. We note that this approach implies a separation between risk and
return choices. Clearly this would hold if the hedging instruments available
to the risk manager are priced fairly. More generally, Sung (1995) provides
sufficient conditions5 under which our results generalize. Our focus is on
5The disutility of efforts associated with risk and return are assumed to be additively
separable.
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the trade-off between the cost of risk management and the risk reduction
achieved by risk monitoring, taking as given that some risk is unavoidable
for a given expected return level.
The manager chooses an effort level, a, incurring cost of effort c measured in
pecuniary terms. The bank earns profits Z, with the following distribution:
Z ∼ N (u, σ2 (a)) . (1)
To ensure a non–trivial solution and avoid wealth effects, we assume that both
the board and the manager have negative exponential utility function with
constant absolute risk aversion coefficients α and β, respectively. Further
the contract offered to the agent, s (Z), is assumed to be linear, that is,
s (Z) = s0 + s1Z.
In a single period principal-agent model, the linear contract would not be op-
timal because a sequence of bang–bang contracts approximates the first best
solution arbitrarily well, (see Mirrlees, 1999). However, we follow Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) in considering our model a simplified representation of
the continuous choice of effort. Under this assumption, Sung (1995) demon-
strates that the optimal second best solution can be implemented using linear
contract when the manager controls the variance of the performance measure.
As alternative rationales for restricting attention to linear contracts, Dia-
mond (1998) shows asymptotic optimality, while Palomino and Prat (1998)
solve a binomial risk management problem under risk neutrality and lim-
ited liability, so that payoff is convex. Finally one could argue that linear
contracts are closer approximations of observed compensation contracts. To
maintain tractability we abstract from limited liability issues. While this is
an important issue for understanding attitudes towards risk taking by banks,
it is less relevant for the choice between different risk systems, and hence we
opt for the simpler specification to get the main message across.
The board offers the contract parameters s0 and s1 to maximize its utility.
Conditional on the choice of these parameters, we can analyze the behavior
of the risk manger. The manager’s utility is
EUm = − exp
(
−αE [s (Z)| a] + αc (a) + α
2
2
VAR [s (Z)| a]
)
.
The first term is the manager’s expected compensation, the second term
gives the disutility of effort, and the last term is the risk premium. For the
contract s (Z) = s0 + s1Z, we can write
EUm = − exp
(
−αs0 − αs1u + αc (a) + α
2
2
s21σ
2
)
.
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Since both board and manager have constant absolute risk aversion and the
random variables are normally distributed for any given effort level, we can
conveniently transform the manager’s expected utility to certainty equiva-
lents:
CEUm = −α−1 ln (−EUm) = s0 + s1u− c (a)− α
2
s21σ
2.
We follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) in assuming that the manager’s
personal cost of effort is linear in effort, i.e., c = ka. Moreover, we sup-
pose that a unit of effort a lowers the risk through the following production
function for risk control
σ2(a) =
Σ
τ + a
,
where Σ and τ are given positive parameters. The risk control function
features a decreasing marginal return on effort. Thus, for any contract char-
acterized by the pair (s0, s1) the manager’s certainty equivalent utility is
CEUm = s0 + s1u− ka− α
2
s21
Σ
τ + a
.
Similarly, after incorporation of the payment to the manger the board receives
Z − s (Z) = (1− s1)Z − s0.
Thus expected utility of the board is
EUb = exp
(
−β E [Z − s (Z)| s0, s1] + β
2
2
VAR [Z − s (Z)| s0, s1]
)
= exp
(
−β(1− s1)u + βs0 + β
2
2
(1− s1)2σ2
)
,
and the certainty equivalent of the board’s utility function is
CEUb = (1− s1)u− s0 − β
2
(1− s1)2σ2.
2.2 Supervision
Our main interest is in understanding the impact that regulatory supervision
has on internal risk modelling within a financial institution. Therefore one
would ideally model regulatory preferences in addition to the principal’s and
agent’s preferences discussed above. Unfortunately, regulatory preferences
are not well understood, with the most cited rational for regulation being
“lowering systemic risk”. That leaves one with the question of how to define
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systemic risk, but no single definition of systemic risk is available. More-
over, a translation from systemic risk tolerance to the risk tolerance by the
regulator imposed on individual banks as a consequence of its systemic risk
tolerance is not available. Therefore, in the current paper we take a positive
approach and simply investigate different risk levels permitted by the regu-
lator and its consequences for the bank, without entering into the objectives
of the regulators and the efficiency of the current Basel-II proposal on the
table.
The board of directors contracts the risk manager to control overall risk
taking at a given level of expected return. The manager will have to be
compensated for this, and in general needs more compensation for a higher
activity level. The regulator desires to contain overall risk taking in the
financial sector, and therefore imposes risk constraints on the bank. We
treat these regulatory risk constraints as exogenous to the decision–making
process. These risk constraints are costly to the bank, e.g., the bank might
be at a competitive disadvantage under regulation, or the bank might have
to be at a lower risk–return profile than desired.
3 Risk Management
We consider two alternative risk management systems, one with a high degree
of delegation of responsibilities to the risk manager, and other with a low
degree of delegation. We label the first system direct risk monitoring and the
second system indirect risk monitoring. When risk monitoring is direct, the
Board observes all decisions made by risk manager, while indirect monitoring
implies that the Board only observes outcomes, i.e., earnings. The direct
system implies first best outcomes while the indirect regime results in second
best outcomes.
Currently, financial intermediaries can choose between calculating their mar-
ket risk in one of two ways. Either they adopt the Basel standardized ap-
proach, or they rely on an internal model subject to supervisory approval.
Furthermore, the BIS is proposing that credit, liquidity, and operational risk
also be regulated by either of the two methods. Typically, the resulting
regulatory capital requirements implied by the two methods of calculation
do differ and hence the institution may act strategically in choosing its risk
management system. This is the central issue of the paper.
There are two possible interpretations of the above scenarios. First, the indi-
rect risk monitoring system may represent the standardized approach, while
the direct risk monitoring system may represents the IRB system. Alter-
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natively, the two systems represent different levels of sophistication under
the IRB approach. At the end of the paper we will relax the stark contrast
between the two systems and allow for a sliding scale of sophistication to
justify the observed heterogeneity of banks’ risk management systems.
The regulator can either choose not to regulate, or to regulate within the
context of each risk management system. In particular, the regulator has
the same information as the board, and can influence the risk management
system. This results in four different cases:
Indirect Risk Monitoring The risk manager’s decision is unobservable to
the board of directors and is non–contractible, but the earnings are
observable and contractible.
Case A Second best: There is no external risk supervision.
Case B Indirect supervision: The regulator monitors risk taking indi-
rectly through earnings announcements, and possibly influences
the risk management process.
Direct or Continuous Risk Monitoring The board of directors imple-
ments a costly risk system that reports on a continuous basis.
Case C Costly first best: There is no external risk supervision.
Case D Direct regulation: The regulator directly monitors the risk
management process, and possibly influences it.
These four different cases are discussed in turn.
3.1 Indirect Risk Monitoring without Regulation
The most common form of risk management within a financial institution
is where the management of the bank, usually the risk committee, specifies
allowable risk and dedicates the task of actually measuring and managing
risk to a risk manager. The dilemma facing the board is that it is unable to
observe how well the risk management does his job except in extreme circum-
stances. As a result, the board only indirectly observes the risk managers
decisions. Even if the risk manager reports VaR numbers to the board, these
VaR numbers are determined by a model created by the risk manager, and
as a result do not represent the actual riskiness of the financial institution
but instead a subjective risk forecast from the risk manager.
9
We capture this in a stylized way by assuming that the manager’s risk man-
agement decision is unobservable to the board and hence is non–contractible.
This gives rise to a second best solution. As was explained above, the risk
manager solves the following problem:
max
a
CEUm = s0 + s1u− ka− α
2
s21
Σ
τ + a
.
From the first order conditions, we get a = −τ + s1
√
αΣ/2k, and after
substitution into CEUm:
CEUm = s0 + s1u + τk − s1
√
2kαΣ. (2)
The volatility level chosen by the manager is
σ2(a) =
√
2kΣ√
α
1
s1
. (3)
The board chooses the contract parameters. Note that although the reward
is based on the random return Z, control is on the variance of Z which is
hidden from the board, who then chooses the contract parameters s0 and s1
such that the manager has a weak incentive to participate, i.e. EUm = −1
or CEUm = 0. From (2) this gives
−s0 = s1u + τk − s1
√
2kαΣ. (4)
Substituting the CEUb from the previous section, we obtain
CEUb = u + τk − s1
√
2kαΣ− β
2
(1− s1)2
√
2kΣ√
α
1
s1
.
Maximize CEUb with respect to s1 to get:
ssecond best1 =
√
β
2α + β
.
From (4) it follows that
ssecond best0 = −u
√
β
2α + β
− τk +
√
2kαβΣ
2α + β
.
Therefore the board’s utility is:
CEU second bestb = u + τk −
2α + β −√β(2α + β)√
α(2α + β)
√
2kβΣ.
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From the manager’s problem we have a = −τ+√αΣ/2ks1. With the solution
for s1, this gives the second best solution for effort and volatility:
asecond best = −τ +
√
αΣ
2k
√
β
2α + β
,
σ2second best =
√
2kΣ (2α + β)
αβ
.
Remark 1 We implicitly assume that the parameters τ, α,Σ, β, k are such
that a > 0. Similarly, we assume that the parameters τ, α,Σ, β, k, u are such
that CEU second bestb > 0. Note that we have enough degrees of freedom for
this to hold (e.g., choose u sufficiently large and τ sufficiently small for any
given positive values of the remaining parameters). Moreover, we require a
small τ to ensure that the board be interested in hiring a risk manager, that
is, CEU second bestb > u− βΣ/2τ .
Remark 2 While not directly relevant for the topic of the paper, one might
like to make explicit the trade-off faced by the board between risk and return
in selecting investment opportunities (the analysis in the paper is carried
out under the presumption that the projects have already been selected). In
the current setup we assume that the board is faced with running projects
with a given level of expected return. A simple way to capture the trade-
off is to make u a sufficiently concave function of Σ, and to let the board
optimize with respect to Σ as well. One easily verifies that this leaves the
above derivations essentially unaffected, except for the fact that u is now
endogenously determined.
3.2 Indirect Risk Monitoring with Regulation
The risk manager reports the outcomes of the risk models to the board as
well as regulators, and these risk forecasts are used to determine minimum
bank capital. As in the previous case, these risk forecasts are merely esti-
mates of the actual riskiness of the financial institution. The regulators do
audit the internal risk models, however, for most parts these models rep-
resent the subjective decisions made by the risk manager. The regulators
supposedly note that the bank’s activities create negative externalities that
must be corrected by means of risk regulation. An example of this arises
when excessive risk-taking, while individually optimal, destabilizes the econ-
omy. While supervision can be costly for several reasons, e.g. due to lack of
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competitiveness, foregone earnings, or audit costs as in Merton (1978), su-
pervision may also increase the rents from monopoly power due to increased
barriers to entry. We capture the effect of supervision by means of a tax on
bank profits. Specifically, we consider a proportional tax on the abnormal
bank profits (unexpected), t, related to the unexpected part of the variable
compensation paid to the risk manager, s1(Z − u), that is, the total tax is
ts1(Z − u). When t > 0, this captures a fundamental aspect of the risk
regulation, i.e., their procyclicality. Under such regulation, the bank records
higher profits in upswings and more losses in downturns than it would if left
unregulated.
The regulatory cost, ts1(Z − u), is transferred between the profit and an
accounting reserve6. If the regulatory tax is placed in an accounting reserve
where the supervisors neither retain part of the accounting reserve nor top
it up, the reserve is self financing. The account will be zero on average since
E[ts1(Z − u)] = 0. If, however, the government serves as the lender of last
resort then it effectively contributes a call option to the accounting reserve.
When the bank earns profit Z, it receives ts1(Z − u) from the accounting
reserve such that the net return to the board becomes
−s0 + (1− s1)Z + ts1(Z − u). (5)
Because the utility of the board of directors is of the mean–variance type
with risk aversion parameter β, its utility becomes
CEUb = −s0 + (1− s1)u− β
2
(1− s1 + ts1)2 σ2.
From the solution of the managers problem (4) we can substitute out s0, and
use (3) to rewrite this as
CEUb = u + τk −
√
2kαΣs1 − β
2
(1− (1− t) s1)2
√
2kΣ√
α
1
s1
.
The board maximizes CEUb with respect to s1. From the first order condi-
tion, the solution for s1 follows
sindirect supervision1 =
√
β
2α + (1− t)2 β .
6This accounting reserve is considered to be part of the capital base, the level of which is
directly related to the risk of other balance sheet items. In The Netherlands for example,
banks are required to administer such an accounting reserve. This requirement works
effectively like a tax on capital since it changes the effective amount of profits distributed
to the owners. To the regulators such an account is an instrument for inducing better risk
management, as we show below.
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By insertion, we get the certainty equivalent utility, CEUb (t). Moreover,
volatility becomes
σ2 =
√
2kΣ√
βα
√
2α + (1− t)2 β.
It is easily seen from this latter expression or from (3) that the regulatory
provision which minimizes risk taking entails maximizing s1, i.e. setting t =
1. The regulatory effect of t = 1 is seen from (5) to undo, from the perspective
of the board, the risk sharing with the manager. From the manager’s point
of view, the project risk combined with higher variable reward parameter s1
increases the incentives for risk reduction.
The risk minimizing solution t = 1 is independent of both the effort aversion
and risk reduction capabilities of the manager, as well as the risk aversion of
the board of directors or the manager. This system exposes the board to more
volatility in order to induce the appropriate risk reduction. The increase of
the board of directors’ exposure to compensation risk is optimal for mean–
variance preferences.7 Note, moreover that with t = 1 the regulatory measure
is procyclical. It has been argued that the Basel-II proposals can have this
effect when implemented, see e.g. The European Central Bank (2001, p.
64–68) .
Remark 3 In the previous subsection we discussed a simple way to capture
the board’s trade-off between risk and return in selecting investment projects
by letting the mean return u depend on Σ. Suppose u = Σφ, where 0 < φ <
1/2. Let the board optimize with respect to Σ as well as over s1. It then
follows that Σ(t = 0) < Σ(t = 1), but σ2(t = 0) > σ2(t = 1). Thus as
a result of the regulatory capital requirements the board selects projects with
higher risk, but the extra effort in containing the risk by the risk manager
following the imposition of the tax more than offsets this effect.
3.3 Direct Risk Monitoring: No Regulation
Suppose that the bank is discontent with only monitoring the final output
of risk management process. The bank therefore installs a risk management
system that reports continuously to the board the level of risk taking. Contin-
uous risk reporting implies that the board controls the manager completely,
leaving no room for hidden action, in effect the board runs the bank. This
7We considered more general regimes. Since, in principle, s0, s1, and Z are all observ-
able to the supervisor a proportional provision could be imposed on each item (denoted
by t0, t1, and t2). The results of these different schemes are all qualitatively similar.
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risk reporting system comes at a fixed cost, F , and measures the variance,
which is a sufficient statistic for VaR given the distributional assumptions.
The VaR system thus reveals the volatility to both parties.
The board can then choose the contract parameters (s0, s1) to obtain a ‘first
best’ solution where the reward could be based directly on the observed
volatility. Hence, the board pays the manager such that she is indifferent
between working or not working, i.e., EUm = −1 or CEUm = 0:
−s0 = s1u− ka− α
2
s21
Σ
τ + a
.
Substituting this into the boards’ utility function yields certainty equivalent
of
CEUb = u− ka− α
2
s21
Σ
τ + a
− F − β
2
(1− s1)2 Σ
τ + a
.
The board maximizes EUb with respect to s1 and a resulting in
scostly first best1 =
β
α + β
.
Indeed, this is the optimal risk sharing in agencies in the absence of moral
hazard, see Wilson (1968). Since this condition does not depend on manage-
rial effort a, we can substitute into CEUb to obtain the following simplifica-
tion:
CEUb = u− ka− 1
2
αβ
α + β
Σ
τ + a
− F.
It follows from maximizing CEUb with respect to choice of a that the costly
first best solutions are
acostly first best = −τ +
√
αβΣ
2k (α + β)
,
σ2costly first best =
√
2kΣ (α + β)
αβ
,
resulting in the boards’ utility
CEU costly first bestb = u + τk − F −
√
2kαβΣ
α + β
.
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3.4 Direct Risk Monitoring with Regulation
Since the project payoffs (1) are normally distributed, the variance σ2 (a) is
a sufficient statistic for VaR. Consequently, exogenous regulation needs only
stipulate an upper bound Ω on the admissible variance:
σ2 ≤ Ω. (6)
In the case of contractible risk management, the regulators as well as the
board of directors observe the VaR. This enables the regulator to directly
supervise risk taking by enforcing the restriction (6). If the constraint (6) is
set such that it is binding, i.e. Σ/ (τ + a) = Ω it implies that effort necessarily
equals
adirectly regulated =
Σ− τΩ
Ω
.
The certainty equivalent of the expected utility of the manager becomes
CEUm = s0 + s1u− kΣ
Ω
+ kτ − α
2
s21Ω.
From the manager participation constraint we get
s0 =
kΣ
Ω
− kτ − s1u + α
2
s21Ω.
The boards’ utility then reads
CEUb = u + kτ − kΣ
Ω
− α
2
s21Ω−
β
2
(1− s1)2 Ω− F.
Maximizing CEUb yields the optimal slope of the manager’s compensation
sdirectly regulated1 =
β
α + β
,
just as in the case of contractible risk management. Hence, the optimal fixed
part of the salary is
sdirectly regulated0 =
kΣ
Ω
− kτ − β
α + β
u +
α
2
Ω
(
β
α + β
)2
and the boards’ utility:
CEUdirectly regulatedb = u + τk −
kΣ
Ω
− αβΩ
2 (α + β)
− F.
Under direct regulation, a continuous VaR reporting system also reports risk
to the supervisors, who in effect free ride on the internal VaR measures. This
might, however, not be in the interest of the bank if the resulting restriction
on risk taking constitutes a competitive disadvantage.
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3.5 Evaluation
In order to compare the four cases, consider the outcomes where the risk
aversion is equal, i.e. α = β, and the capital adequacy tax minimizes risk
taking, i.e. t = 1 and Ω in (6) is set binding:
Case A CEU second bestb = u + τk −
√
2kαΣ[
√
3− 1],
Case B CEU indirect supervisionb = u + τk −
√
2kαΣ
√
2,
Case C CEU costly first bestb = u + τk −
√
kαΣ− F,
Case D CEUdirectly regulatedb = u + τk − kΣΩ − αΩ4 − F.
In this situation the bank prefers no regulation:8
Proposition 1 Since CEU indirect supervisionb < CEU
second best
b , and
CEUdirectly regulatedb < CEU
costly first best
b , the board prefers no regulations.
Proof. Direct since
√
3 − 1 < √2, and √kαΣ < kΣ
Ω
+ αΩ
4
, if the constraint
(6) is binding.
Consider the unregulated industry. Even in the absence of regulation, the
industry might self–enforce a comprehensive VaR reporting system.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is no external supervision. If
F <
√
2kαΣ
[√
3− 1− 1√
2
]
, the bank will install the continuous risk man-
agement system.
Proof. From CEU costly first bestb = CEU
second best
b , we obtain
F =
√
2kαΣ
[√
3− 1− 1√
2
]
.
Therefore, if the cost of the VaR reporting system F is moderate, the board
of directors will opt for the continuous risk management system.9
The decision whether to install the continuous risk measurement system, de-
pends on the regulatory environment. In the quote in the introduction, FRB
Governor L. H. Meyer hinted that regulators may in the future incorporate
the internal risk management process more closely into the supervisory pro-
cess. However, this might not be in the interest of the board of directors if
the resulting restriction on risk taking constitutes a competitive disadvan-
tage. We compare two cases of regulation.
8Regulation may also work as an entry deterrence, and hence may actually be liked by
the management for this reason.
9Note that, absent competition in the market for risk management systems, it is con-
ceivable that the dominant risk management consultant is able to extract all the surplus
until F =
√
2kαΣ
[√
3− 1− 1√
2
]
.
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Proposition 3 With regulation where the fixed cost of the continuous risk
management system is negligible, i.e. F = 0 so that in the absence of regula-
tion the VaR system is implemented, the board of directors may nevertheless
choose not to install the risk management system in the presence of supervi-
sion.
Proof. Consider the regulated case where the supervisor benefits from the
presence of the sophisticated risk management system. From the following
partial derivatives
∂CEUdirect regulationb
∂Ω
= kΣΩ−2 − α/4
and
∂2CEUdirect regulationb
∂Ω2
= −2kΣΩ−3 < 0,
we see that CEUdirect regulationb is concave in the imposed risk level Ω, and
attains its maximum at Ω = σ2first best = 2
√
kΣ/α. In that case
CEUdirect regulationb = CEU
first best
b = u + τk −
√
kαΣ > 0.
Moreover
lim
Ω→0
CEUdirect regulationb = −∞.
If the board has not installed the continuous VaR reporting system, the
supervisors can not directly observe risk taking. Hence they attempt to
regulate indirectly via the capital requirements ts1Z, and choose the optimal
rate t = 1, therefore
CEU indirect supervisionb = u + τk − 2
√
kαΣ.
Since u + τk − 2√kαΣ < u + τk −√kαΣ, but τk − 2√kαΣ > −∞, we can
clearly find cases where CEU indirect supervisionb < CEU
direct regulation
b , but also
values of Ω for which CEU indirect supervisionb > CEU
direct regulation
b .
10
From these results we see that the bank’s optimal risk monitoring intensity
depends not simply on market conditions and bargaining power with the
risk manager, but also on the actions of the supervisory agencies. If the
bank perceives the cost of regulation to be too high, it may opt for a lower
quality risk management system, since that can lower regulatory cost. As the
quote by Governor Meyer indicates, regulators are aware of this. Presently,
10Note that if the fixed costs F are non-zero, this conclusion is only reinforced.
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anecdotal evidence indicates that some banks employ dual risk management
systems, one for external and another for internal purposes. If the supervisory
authorities then demand access to the internal control system, banks might
find yet another way to avoid disclosing too much information about their
risk taking activities.
We finally argue that the modelling approach taken above is quite general
and does not hinge on the stark differences between the two alternative risk
management systems. We chose a specific parameterization of the relation
between risk management activities and the reduction in variance. We could
have allowed for a distinction between actual bank profits and the observ-
able and contractible profitability measure based on which the risk manager is
compensated. The measurement error in the contracting relationship would
tend to exacerbate the difference between the indirect and direct risk mon-
itoring. Nonetheless, we can show that the qualitative results remain, but
giving a continuous variation in risk management quality varying with the
cost structure of a particular bank. This is shown in the Appendix.
Alternatively, we could have allowed a stochastic variance for any given level
of effort. If for any given realized variance, firm profits are normally dis-
tributed, linear contracts can still be employed for the reasons outlined above,
see references in Sung (1995). Under indirect risk management, the main dif-
ference is that the risk manager must be compensated for the additional risk
associated with uncertain variance. This is intuitive because of the induced
fatter tails in the distribution. Under direct risk management, however, the
observed, realized variance no longer perfectly reveals the risk manager’s
action and could overstate or understate the intended risk exposure of the
bank.
4 Conclusion
Regulation of the financial industry is primarily motivated by fear of a sys-
temic crisis. Bank regulation takes place in an environment of rapid tech-
nological advancements and deregulation. This makes preventing systemic
crises by regulatory means increasingly difficult. Indeed, as the present
regulatory structure appears to have been created without much regard to
financial–economic developments, its suitability for its task remains in doubt.
A rapidly increasing body of literature on financial regulation and financial
crises is emerging, and hence our understanding of how to optimally regulate
the finance sector has grown. To the best of our knowledge the selection of a
particular risk management system by the board has received little attention.
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We consider the financial–economic implications of externally imposed risk
constraints in an imperfect market setting: a principal–agent relationship
between a regulator, a bank’s board of directors, and a risk manager. We
model explicitly the strategic choice between alternative risk management
systems and the influence of regulation on this choice. The regulators ex-
plicitly allow for this by giving banks the choice between two quite different
approaches towards determining the regulatory capital; moreover, within the
IRB approach there are several degrees of freedom for the institution as to
how to proceed with the risk measurement. Typically, the resulting regula-
tory capital requirements implied by the two methods of calculation do differ
and hence the institution may act strategically in choosing its risk manage-
ment system. This is the central issue of the paper. Thus, the presence of
external regulation has real effects, like the noted procyclicality.
There is potential for a decrease in the banks’ market value coupled with
an increase in total risk as a consequence of regulatory actions. As a result,
improperly crafted regulations can have serious unintended consequences,
and a bad regulatory design may be worse than no regulation. Therefore,
it is important to subject regulatory designs to rigorous financial–economic
analysis prior to implementation. In particular, we give conditions under
which the bank when left to itself chooses a better risk management system
than when it is supervised.
Lastly, an interesting issue is also whether the capital determined by the
IRB is actually binding. Most academic literature seems to assume that fi-
nancial institutions minimize capital, e.g., that in the case of market risk
capital equals three times VaR plus a constant. This is however an incorrect
assumption. Most banks are considerably overcapitalized, and while regu-
latory capital might represent the minimum allowable capital, it is a point
seldom reached. The question of why banks are overcapitalized is interest-
ing. While the banks give multiple explanations for this, one cannot escape
the feeling that bank over capitalization is one manifestation of information
asymmetry. If a bank’s minimum allowable capital is 8% but it’s actual cap-
ital is 13%, as often is the case, the bank must a very good reason for this.
Perhaps the reason is that the bank really is riskier than the regulatory model
implies. After all, if the regulatory risk model is accurate there is no reason
to be significantly overcapitalized. In other words, the bank realizes that the
regulatory VaR model is unreliable, and uses a different model for internal
capital determination. We have captured this information asymmetry in a
stylist way in our model.
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5 Appendix
Suppose the risk manager can only measure the banks positions with error.
This reflects the real world where the bank can only approximate its holdings
in real-time due to administrative hurdles. Let Z represent as before the real
return, and let r be a noisy signal with precision γ. The measured return is
then Zˆ where
Zˆ = Z + r
The distribution of the signal is
r ∼ iid N
(
0,
1
γ
)
As a result, the perceived production function for volatility is therefore
σˆ2 (a) =
Σ
τ + a
+
1
γ
= σ2 +
1
γ
, γ ≥ 0
where σ is the real volatility while σˆ is the perceived volatility, with σˆ ≥ σ,
where γ is known to the agent, and is determined by the principal. The cost
of the risk model for the principal is assumed to be proportional to the signal
precision, i.e., γF . In this case it is prohibitively expensive for the principal
to exactly measure risk, and infeasible not to allocate any resources to risk
management.
The board of directors pay the manager just enough to be willing to work,
that is, CEUm = 0:
−s0 = s1u− ka− α
2
s21
(
Σ
τ + a
+
1
γ
)
.
Since both the principle and agent perceive volatility and hence risk as the
same, as before from the manager’s problem
σˆ2 (a) =
√
2kΣ√
α
1
s1
.
Use this to obtain the board of directors’ objective
CEUb = u + τk − s1
√
2kαΣ− γF − β
2
(1− s1)2
√
2kΣ√
α
1
s1
− β
2
1
γ
s1
2 − α
2
1
γ
s1
2.
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Maximize CEUb with respect (s1, γ). The solution from the first order nec-
essary conditions is
s1 =
√
β
β + 2α[1 +
√
(α + β)F/kαΣ]
and
γ =
√
β(α + β)/2
βF + 2α[1 +
√
(α + β)/kαΣ]F 3/2
.
It follows that d(1/γ)/dF > 0.
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